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Abstract—Random numbers have been one of the most useful
objects in statistics, computer science, cryptography, modeling,
simulation, and other applications though it is very difficult to
construct true randomness. Many solutions (e.g., cryptographic
pseudorandom generators) have been proposed to harness or
simulate randomness and many statistical testing techniques have
been proposed to determine whether a pseudorandom generator
produces high quality randomness. NIST SP800-22 (2010) pro-
poses the state of art testing suite for (pseudo) random generators
to detect deviations of a binary sequence from randomness. On
the one hand, as a counter example to NIST SP800-22 test suite,
it is easy to construct functions that are considered as GOOD
pseudorandom generators by NIST SP800-22 test suite though
the output of these functions are easily distinguishable from the
uniform distribution. Thus these functions are not pseudorandom
generators by definition. On the other hand, NIST SP800-22
does not cover some of the important laws for randomness. Two
fundamental limit theorems about random binary strings are
the central limit theorem and the law of the iterated logarithm
(LIL). Several frequency related tests in NIST SP800-22 cover
the central limit theorem while no NIST SP800-22 test covers
LIL.
This paper proposes techniques to address the above challenges
that NIST SP800-22 testing suite faces. Firstly, we propose
statistical distance based testing techniques for (pseudo) random
generators to reduce the above mentioned Type II errors in NIST
SP800-22 test suite. Secondly, we propose LIL based statistical
testing techniques, calculate the probabilities, and carry out
experimental tests on widely used pseudorandom generators
by generating around 30TB of pseudorandom sequences. The
experimental results show that for a sample size of 1000 sequences
(2TB), the statistical distance between the generated sequences
and the uniform distribution is around 0.07 (with 0 for sta-
tistically indistinguishable and 1 for completely distinguishable)
and the root-mean-square deviation is around 0.005. Though the
statistical distance 0.07 and RMSD 0.005 are acceptable for some
applications, for a cryptographic “random oracle”, the preferred
statistical distance should be smaller than 0.03 and RMSD be
smaller than 0.001 at the sample size 1000. These results justify
the importance of LIL testing techniques designed in this paper.
The experimental results in this paper are reproducible and the
raw experimental data are available at author’s website.
I. Introduction
Secure cryptographic hash functions such as SHA1, SHA2,
and SHA3 and symmetric key block ciphers (e.g., AES and
TDES) have been commonly used to design pseudorandom
generators with counter modes (e.g., in Java Crypto Library
and in NIST SP800-90A standards). Though security of hash
functions such as SHA1, SHA2, and SHA3 has been exten-
sively studied from the one-wayness and collision resistant
aspects, there has been limited research on the quality of long
pseudorandom sequences generated by cryptographic hash
functions. Even if a hash function (e.g., SHA1) performs
like a random function based on existing statistical tests
(e.g., NIST SP800-22 Revision 1A [17]), when it is called
many times for a long sequence generation, the resulting long
sequence may not satisfy the properties of pseudorandomness
and could be distinguished from a uniformly chosen sequence.
For example, the recent reports from New York Times [16] and
The Guardian [1] show that NSA has included back doors
in NIST SP800-90A pseudorandom bit generators (on which
our experiments are based on) to get online cryptanalytic
capabilities.
Statistical tests are commonly used as a first step in de-
termining whether or not a generator produces high quality
random bits. For example, NIST SP800-22 Revision 1A [17]
proposed the state of art statistical testing techniques for
determining whether a random or pseudorandom generator
is suitable for a particular cryptographic application. NIST
SP800-22 includes 15 tests: frequency (monobit), number of
1-runs and 0-runs, longest-1-runs, binary matrix rank, discrete
Fourier transform, template matching, Maurer’s “universal
statistical” test, linear complexity, serial test, the approximate
entropy, the cumulative sums (cusums), the random excur-
sions, and the random excursions variants. In a statistical test
of [17], a significance level α ∈ [0.001, 0.01] is chosen for
each test. For each input sequence, a P-value is calculated
and the input string is accepted as pseudorandom if P-value
≥ α. A pseudorandom generator is considered good if, with
probability α, the sequences produced by the generator fail the
test. For an in-depth analysis, NIST SP800-22 recommends
additional statistical procedures such as the examination of
P-value distributions (e.g., using χ2-test).
NIST SP800-22 test suite has inherent limitations with
straightforward Type II errors. For example, for a function F
that mainly outputs “random strings” but, with probability α,
outputs biased strings (e.g., strings consisting mainly of 0’s),
F will be considered as a “good” pseudorandom generator
by NIST SP800-22 test though the output of F could be
distinguished from the uniform distribution (thus, F is not a
pseudorandom generator by definition). In the following, we
use two examples to illustrate this kind of Type II errors. Let
RANDc,n be the sets of Kolmogorov c-random binary strings
of length n, where c ≥ 1. That is, for a universal Turing
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2machine M, let
RANDc,n = {x ∈ {0, 1}n : if M(y) = x then |y|≥ |x|−c} . (1)
Let α be a given significance level of NIST SP800-22 test
and R2n = R1 ∪ R2 where R1 is a size 2n(1 − α) subset of
RAND2,2n and R2 is a size 2nα subset of {0nx : x ∈ {0, 1}n}.
Furthermore, let fn : {0, 1}n → R2n be an ensemble of random
functions (not necessarily computable) such that f (x) is chosen
uniformly at random from R2n. Then for each n-bit string x,
with probability 1 − α, fn(x) is Kolmogorov 2-random and
with probability α, fn(x) ∈ R2. Since all Kolmogorov 2-
random strings are guaranteed to pass NIST SP800-22 test
at significance level α (otherwise, they are not Kolmogorov 2-
random by definition) and all strings in R2 fail NIST SP800-22
test at significance level α for large enough n, the function
ensemble { fn}n∈N is considered as a “good” pseudorandom
generator by NIST SP800-22 test suite. On the other hand,
Theorem 3.2 in Wang [24] shows that RAND2,2n (and R1)
could be efficiently distinguished from the uniform distribution
with a non-negligible probability. A similar argument could be
used to show that R2n could be efficiently distinguished from
the uniform distribution with a non-negligible probability.
In other words, { fn}n∈N is not a cryptographically secure
pseudorandom generator.
As another example, let { f ′n}n∈N be a pseudorandom gener-
ator with f ′n : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}l(n) where l(n) > n. Assume that
{ f ′n}n∈N is a good pseudorandom generator by NIST SP800-22
in-depth statistical analysis of the P-value distributions (e.g.,
using χ2-test). Define a new pseudorandom generators { fn}n∈N
as follows:
fn(x) =
{
f ′n(x) if f ′n(x) contains more 0’s than 1’s
f ′n(x) ⊕ 1l(n) otherwise
(2)
Then it is easy to show that { fn}n∈N is also a good pseudoran-
dom generator by NIST SP800-22 in-depth statistical analysis
of the P-value distributions (e.g., using χ2-test). However, the
output of { fn}n∈N is trivially distinguishable from the uniform
distribution.
The above two examples show the limitation of testing
approaches specified in NIST SP800-22. The limitation is
mainly due to the fact that NIST SP800-22 does not fully
realize the differences between the two common approaches
to pseudorandomness definitions as observed and analyzed in
Wang [24]. In other words, the definition of pseudorandom
generators is based on the indistinguishability concepts though
techniques in NIST SP800-22 mainly concentrate on the
performance of individual strings. In this paper, we propose
testing techniques that are based on statistical distances such
as root-mean-square deviation or Hellinger distance. The sta-
tistical distance based approach is more accurate in deviation
detection and avoids above type II errors in NIST SP800-22.
Our approach is illustrated using the LIL test design.
Feller [6] mentioned that the two fundamental limit theo-
rems of random binary strings are the central limit theorem
and the law of the iterated logarithm. Feller [6] also called
attention to the study of the behavior of the maximum of
the absolute values of the partial sums S¯ n =
max1≤k≤n |2S (ξ |` k)|−n√
n
and Erdos and Kac [5] obtained the limit distribution of S¯ n.
NIST SP800-22 test suite includes several frequency related
tests that cover the first central limit theorem and the cusum
test, “the cumulative sums (cusums) test”, that covers the limit
distribution of S¯ n. However it does not include any test for the
important law of the iterated logarithm. Thus it is important
to design LIL based statistical tests. The law of the iterated
logarithm (LIL) says that, for a pseudorandom sequence ξ,
the value S lil(ξ[0..n − 1]) (this value is defined in Theorem
3.3) should stay in [−1, 1] and reach both ends infinitely often
when n increases. It is known [21], [22], [23] that polynomial
time pseudorandom sequences follow LIL. It is also known
[7] that LIL holds for uniform distributions. Thus LIL should
hold for both Kolmogorov complexity based randomness and
for “behavioristic” approach based randomness.
This paper designs LIL based weak, strong, and snapshot
statistical tests and obtains formulae for calculating the prob-
abilities that a random sequence passes the LIL based tests.
We have carried out some experiments to test outcomes of
several commonly used pseudorandom generators. In partic-
ular, we generated 30TB of sequences using several NIST
recommended pseudorandom generators. Our results show that
at the sample size 1000 (or 2TB of data), sequences produced
by several commonly used pseudorandom generators have a
LIL based statistical distance 0.07 from true random sources.
On the other hand, at the sample size 10000 (20TB of data),
sequences produced by NIST-SHA256 based pseudorandom
generators have a LIL based statistical distance 0.02 from true
random sources. These distances are larger than expected for
cryptographic applications.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces
notations. Section III discusses the law of iterated logarithms
(LIL). Section IV reviews the normal approximation to bino-
mial distributions. Sections V, VI, and VII propose weak and
strong LIL tests. Section VIII describes the steps to evaluate
a pseudorandom generator. Section introduces Snapshot LIL
tests. Section X reports experimental results and we conclude
with Section XI.
II. Notations and pseudorandom generators
In this paper, N and R+ denotes the set of natural numbers
(starting from 0) and the set of non-negative real numbers,
respectively. Σ = {0, 1} is the binary alphabet, Σ∗ is the set of
(finite) binary strings, Σn is the set of binary strings of length
n, and Σ∞ is the set of infinite binary sequences. The length of
a string x is denoted by |x|. λ is the empty string. For strings
x, y ∈ Σ∗, xy is the concatenation of x and y, x v y denotes
that x is an initial segment of y. For a sequence x ∈ Σ∗ ∪ Σ∞
and a natural number n ≥ 0, x |` n = x[0..n − 1] denotes the
initial segment of length n of x (x |` n = x[0..n − 1] = x if
|x|≤ n) while x[n] denotes the nth bit of x, i.e., x[0..n − 1] =
x[0] . . . x[n − 1]. For a set C of infinite sequences, Prob[C]
denotes the probability that ξ ∈ C when ξ is chosen by a
3uniform random experiment. Martingales are used to describe
betting strategies in probability theory.
Definition 2.1: (Ville [19]) A martingale is a function F :
Σ∗ → R+ such that, for all x ∈ Σ∗,
F(x) =
F(x1) + F(x0)
2
.
We say that a martingale F succeeds on a sequence ξ ∈ Σ∞ if
lim supn F(ξ[0..n − 1]) = ∞.
The concept of “effective similarity” by Goldwasser and
Micali [10] and Yao [25] is defined as follows: Let X = {Xn}n∈N
and Y = {Yn}n∈N be two probability ensembles such that each
of Xn and Yn is a distribution over Σn. We say that X and Y are
computationally (or statistically) indistinguishable if for every
feasible algorithm A (or every algorithm A), the total variation
difference between Xn and Yn is a negligible function in n.
Definition 2.2: Let {Xn}n∈N and {Yn}n∈N be two probability
ensembles. {Xn}n∈N and {Yn}n∈N are computationally (respec-
tively, statistically) indistinguishable if for any polynomial
time computable set D ∈ Σ∗ (respectively, any set D ∈ Σ∗)
and any polynomial p, the inequality (3) holds for almost all
n.
|Prob[A(Xn) = 1] − Prob[A(Yn) = 1]|≤ 1p(n) (3)
Let l : N → N with l(n) ≥ n for all n ∈ N and G be a
polynomial-time computable algorithm such that |G(x)|= l(|x|)
for all x ∈ Σ∗.
Then the pseudorandom generator concept [3], [25] is
defined as follows.
Definition 2.3: Let l : N → N with l(n) > n for all n ∈
N, and {Un}n∈N be the uniform distribution. A pseudorandom
generator is a polynomial-time algorithm G with the following
properties:
1) |G(x)|= l(|x|) for all x ∈ Σ∗.
2) The ensembles {G(Un)}n∈N and {Un}n∈N are computation-
ally indistinguishable.
Let RANDc = ∪n∈NRANDc,n where RANDc,n is the set of
Kolmogorov c-random sequences that is defined in equation
(1). Then we have
Theorem 2.4: ([24, Theorem 3.2]) The ensemble Rc =
{Rc,n}n∈N is not pseudorandom.
Theorem 2.4 shows the importance for a good pseudoran-
dom generator to fail each statistical test with certain given
probability.
III. Stochastic Properties of Long Pseudorandom Sequences
Classical infinite random sequences were first introduced
as a type of disordered sequences, called “Kollektivs", by
von Mises [20] as a foundation for probability theory. The
two features characterizing a Kollektiv are: the existence
of limiting relative frequencies within the sequence and the
invariance of these limits under the operation of an “admissible
place selection". Here an admissible place selection is a
procedure for selecting a subsequence of a given sequence
ξ in such a way that the decision to select a term ξ[n] does
not depend on the value of ξ[n]. Ville [19] showed that von
Mises’ approach is not satisfactory by proving that: for each
countable set of “admissible place selection" rules, there exists
a “Kollektiv" which does not satisfy the law of the iterated
logarithm (LIL). Later, Martin-Löf [14] developed the notion
of random sequences based on the notion of typicalness. A
sequence is typical if it is not in any constructive null sets.
Schnorr [18] introduced p-randomness concepts by defining
the constructive null sets as polynomial time computable
measure 0 sets. The law of the iterated logarithm (LIL) plays
a central role in the study of the Wiener process and Wang
[23] showed that LIL holds for p-random sequences.
Computational complexity based pseudorandom sequences
have been studied extensively in the literature. For example,
p-random sequences are defined by taking each polynomial
time computable martingale as a statistical test.
Definition 3.1: (Schnorr [18]) An infinite sequence ξ ∈ Σ∞
is p-random (polynomial time random) if for any polynomial
time computable martingale F, F does not succeed on ξ.
A sequence ξ ∈ Σ∞ is Turing machine computable if there
exists a Turing machine M to calculate the bits ξ[0], ξ[1], · · ·.
In the following, we prove a theorem which says that, for each
Turing machine computable non p-random sequence ξ, there
exists a martingale F such that the process of F succeeding
on ξ can be efficiently observed in time O(n2). The theorem
is useful in the characterizations of p-random sequences and
in the characterization of LIL-test waiting period.
Theorem 3.2: ([23]) For a sequence ξ ∈ Σ∞ and a poly-
nomial time computable martingale F, F succeeds on ξ if
and only if there exists a martingale F′ and a non-decreasing
O(n2)-time computable (with respect to the unary represen-
tation of numbers) function from h : N → N such that
F′(ξ[0..n − 1]) ≥ h(n) for all n.
It is shown in [23] that p-random sequences are stochastic
in the sense of von Mises and satisfy common statistical laws
such as the law of the iterated logarithm. It is not difficult to
show that all p-random sequences pass the NIST SP800-22
[17] tests for significance level 0.01 since each test in [17]
could be converted to a polynomial time computable martin-
gale which succeeds on all sequences that do not pass this test.
However, none of the sequences generated by pseudorandom
generators are p-random since from the generator algorithm
itself, a martingale can be constructed to succeed on sequences
that it generates.
Since there is no efficient mechanism to generate p-random
sequences, pseudorandom generators are commonly used to
produce long sequences for cryptographic applications. While
the required uniformity property (see NIST SP800-22 [17])
for pseudorandom sequences is equivalent to the law of large
numbers, the scalability property (see [17]) is equivalent to the
invariance property under the operation of “admissible place
selection” rules. Since p-random sequences satisfy common
statistical laws, it is reasonable to expect that pseudorandom
sequences produced by pseudorandom generators satisfy these
laws also (see, e.g., [17]).
The law of the iterated logarithm (LIL) describes the
fluctuation scales of a random walk. For a nonempty string
4x ∈ Σ∗, let
S (x) =
|x|−1∑
i=0
x[i] and S ∗(x) =
2 · S (x) − |x|√|x|
where S (x) denotes the number of 1s in x and S ∗(x) denotes
the reduced number of 1s in x. S ∗(x) amounts to measuring
the deviations of S (x) from |x|2 in units of
1
2
√
|x|.
The law of large numbers says that, for a pseudo random
sequence ξ, the limit of S (ξ[0..n−1])n is
1
2 , which corresponds
to the frequency (Monobit) test in NIST SP800-22 [17]. But
it says nothing about the reduced deviation S ∗(ξ[0..n − 1]).
It is intuitively clear that, for a pseudorandom sequence ξ,
S ∗(ξ[0..n − 1]) will sooner or later take on arbitrary large
values (though slowly). The law of the iterated logarithm
(LIL), which was first discovered by Khintchine [12], gives
an optimal upper bound
√
2 ln ln n for the fluctuations of
S ∗(ξ[0..n−1]). It was showed in Wang [23] that this law holds
for p-random sequences also.
Theorem 3.3: (LIL for p-random sequences [23]) For a
sequence ξ ∈ Σ∞, let
S lil(ξ |` n) = 2
∑n−1
i=0 ξ[i] − n√
2n ln ln n
(4)
Then for each p-random sequence ξ ∈ Σ∞ we have both
lim sup
n→∞
S lil(ξ |` n) = 1 and lim inf
n→∞ S lil(ξ |` n) = −1.
IV. Normal Approximations to S lil
In this section, we provide several results on normal
approximations to the function S lil(·) that will be used in
next sections. The DeMoivre-Laplace theorem is a normal
approximation to the binomial distribution, which says that
the number of “successes” in n independent coin flips with
head probability 1/2 is approximately a normal distribution
with mean n/2 and standard deviation
√
n/2. We first review
a few classical results on the normal approximation to the
binomial distribution.
Definition 4.1: The normal density function with mean µ
and variance σ is defined as
f (x) =
1
σ
√
2pi
e−
(x−µ)2
2σ2 ; (5)
For µ = 0 and σ = 1, we have the standard normal density
function
ϕ(x) =
1√
2pi
e−
x2
2 , (6)
its integral
Φ(x) =
∫ x
−∞
ϕ(y)dy (7)
is the standard normal distribution function.
Lemma 4.2: ([7, Chapter VII.1, p175]) For every x > 0, we
have
(x−1 − x−3)ϕ(x) < 1 − Φ(x) < x−1ϕ(x) (8)
The following DeMoivre-Laplace limit theorem is derived
from the approximation Theorem on page 181 of [7].
Theorem 4.3: For fixed x1, x2, we have
lim
n→∞ Prob
[
x1 ≤ S ∗(ξ |` n) ≤ x2] = Φ(x2) − Φ(x1). (9)
The growth speed for the above approximation is bounded by
max{k2/n2, k4/n3} where k = S (ξ |` n) − n2 .
The following lemma is useful for interpreting S ∗ based
approximation results into S lil based approximation. It is
obtained by noting the fact that
√
2 ln ln n ·S lil(ξ |` n) = S ∗(ξ |` n).
Lemma 4.4: For any x1, x2, we have
Prob
[
x1 < S lil(ξ |` n) < x2]
= Prob
[
x1
√
2 ln ln n < S ∗(ξ |` n) < x2
√
2 ln ln n
]
In this paper, we only consider tests for n ≥ 226 and x2 ≤ 1.
That is, S ∗(ξ |` n) ≤ √2 ln ln n. Thus
k = S (ξ |` n) − n
2
'
√
n
2
S ∗(ξ |` n) ≤ √2n ln ln n/2.
Hence, we have
max
{
k2
n2
,
k4
n3
}
=
k2
n2
=
(1 − α)2 ln ln n
2n
< 2−22
By Theorem 4.3, the approximation probability calculation
errors in this paper will be less than 0.0000002 < 222 which
is negligible. Unless stated otherwise, we will not mention the
approximation errors in the remainder of this paper.
V. Weak-LIL test and design
Theorem 3.3 shows that pseudorandom sequences should
satisfy the law of the iterated logarithm (LIL). Thus we
propose the following weak LIL test for random sequences.
Weak LIL Test: Let α ∈ (0, 0.25] and ℵ ⊂ N be a subset
of natural numbers, we say that a sequence ξ does not pass
the weak (α,ℵ)-LIL test if −1 + α < S lil(ξ |` n) < 1 − α for
all n ∈ ℵ. Furthermore, P(α,ℵ) denotes the probability that a
random sequence passes the weak (α,ℵ)-LIL test, and E(α,ℵ)
is the set of sequences that pass the weak (α,ℵ)-LIL test.
By the definition, a sequence ξ passes the weak (α,ℵ)-LIL
test if S lil reaches either 1 − α or −1 + α at some points in
ℵ. In practice, it is important to choose appropriate test point
set ℵ and calculate the probability for a random sequence ξ
to pass the weak (α,ℵ)-LIL test. In this section we calculate
the probability for a sequence to pass the weak (α,ℵ)-LIL test
with the following choices of ℵ:
ℵ0 = {20n1}, · · · ,ℵt = {2tn1}, and
⋃
ℵi
for given n1 and t. Specifically, we will consider the cases for
t = 8 and n1 = 226.
Theorem 5.1: Let x1, · · · , xt ∈ {0, 1}n. Then we have
S lil(x1) + · · · + S lil(xt) = S lil(x1 · · · xt) ·
√
t ln ln(tn)
ln ln n
(10)
5Proof. By (4), we have
S lil(x1) + · · · + S lil(xt) = 2
∑t
i=1 S (xi) − tn√
2n ln ln n
=
2 · S (x1 · · · xt) − tn√
2n ln ln n
=
2 · S (x1 · · · xt) − tn√
2 · tn ln ln tn ·
√
t ln ln tn
ln ln n
= S lil(x1 · · · xt) ·
√
t ln ln(tn)
ln ln n
(11)

Theorem 5.1 can be generalized as follows.
Theorem 5.2: Let x1 ∈ {0, 1}sn and x2 ∈ {0, 1}tn. Then we
have
(12)S lil(x1)
√
s ln ln(sn) + S lil(x2)
√
t ln ln(tn)
= S lil(x1x2)
√
(s + t) ln ln((s + t)n)
Proof. We first note that
S lil(x1)
√
s ln ln(sn) = (2 · S (x1) − sn)/
√
2n (13)
S lil(x2)
√
t ln ln(tn) = (2 · S (x2) − tn)/
√
2n (14)
By adding equations (13) and (14) together, we get (12). The
theorem is proved. 
Corollary 5.3: Let 0 < θ < 1 and 1 ≤ s < t. For given ξ |` sn
with S lil(ξ |` sn) = ε and randomly chosen ξ[sn..tn − 1],
Prob
[
S lil(ξ |` tn) ≥ θ] =
Prob
S ∗(ξ[sn..tn − 1]) ≥ √ 2t − s (θ√t ln ln tn−
ε
√
s ln ln sn
] (15)
Proof. By Theorem 5.2, we have
S lil(ξ[0..tn − 1])
√
t ln ln tn =
S lil(ξ[sn..tn − 1])
√
(t − s) ln ln(t − s)n + ε√s ln ln sn.
(16)
Thus S lil(ξ[0..tn − 1]) ≥ θ if, and only if,
S lil(ξ[sn..tn − 1]) ≥ θ
√
t ln ln tn − ε√s ln ln sn√
(t − s) ln ln(t − s)n (17)
By Lemma 4.4, (17) is equivalent to (18).
S ∗(ξ[sn..tn − 1]) ≥
√
2
t − s
(
θ
√
t ln ln tn − ε√s ln ln sn
)
(18)
In other words, (15) holds. 
After these preliminary results, we will begin to calculate
the probability for a random sequence to pass the weak (α,ℵ)-
LIL test.
Example 5.4: For α = 0.1, α = 0.05, and ℵi = {2i+26} with
0 ≤ i ≤ 8, the entry at (ℵi,ℵi) in Table I list the probability
P(α,ℵ) that a random sequence passes the weak (α,ℵi)-LIL test.
Proof. Let θ = 1 − α. By Theorem 4.3 and Lemma 4.4,
(19)Prob
[|S lil(ξ |` n)|≥ θ] ' 2(1 − Φ(θ√2 ln ln n)).
By substituting θ = 0.95 (respectively 0.9), and n =
226, · · · , n = 234 into (19), we obtain the value P(0.1,ℵi) (respec-
tively P(0.05,ℵi)) at the entry (ℵi,ℵi) in Table I. This completes
the proof of the Theorem. 
Now we consider the probability for a random sequence to
pass the weak (α,ℵ)-LIL test with ℵ as the union of two ℵi.
First we present the following union theorem.
Theorem 5.5: For fixed 0 < α < 1 and t ≥ 2, let θ = 1 − α,
ℵ = {n, tn}, ℵa = {n}, ℵb = {tn}. We have
P(α,ℵ) ' P(α,ℵa)+
1
pi
∫ θ√2 ln ln n
−θ√2 ln ln n
∫ ∞
√
1
t−1 (θ
√
2t ln ln tn−y)
e−
x2+y2
2 dxdy
(20)
Alternatively, we have
P(α,ℵ) ' P(α,ℵa) + P(α,ℵb)−
1
pi
∫ ∞
θ
√
2 ln ln n
∫ ∞
√
1
t−1 (θ
√
2t ln ln tn−y)
e−
x2+y2
2 dxdy
(21)
Proof. Since E(α,ℵ) = E(α,ℵa) ∪ E(α,ℵb), we have
P(α,ℵ) =
(
P(α,ℵa) + P(α,ℵb)
) − P(α,ℵa∩ℵb)
where
E(α,ℵa∩ℵb) =
{
ξ : |S lil(ξ |` n)| > θ
∨
|S lil(ξ |` tn)| > θ
}
.
By symmetry, it suffices to show that
Prob
[
S lil(ξ |` tn) ≥ θ|E(α,ℵa)
]
' 12pi
∫ θ√2 ln ln n
−θ√2 ln ln n
∫ ∞√
1
t−1 (θ
√
2t ln ln tn−y) e
− x2+y22 dxdy
(22)
Let ∆1 =
√
2 ln ln n ·∆z. By Corollary 5.3, the probability that
S lil(ξ |` n) ∈ [z, z + ∆z] and S lil(ξ |` tn) > θ is approximately∫ z√2 ln ln n+∆1
z
√
2 ln ln n
ϕ(x)dx
∫ ∞
√
2
t−1 (θ
√
t ln ln tn−z√ln ln n)
ϕ(x)dx
' ∆1 · ϕ(z
√
2 ln ln n) ·
∫ ∞
√
2
t−1 (θ
√
t ln ln tn−z√ln ln n)
ϕ(x)dx
(23)
By substituting y = z
√
2 ln ln n and integrating the equation
(23) over the interval y ∈ [−θ√2 ln ln n, θ√2 ln ln n], we get
the equation (22).
The equation (21) could be proved similarly by the follow-
ing observation: a sequence passes the weak (α,ℵ)-LIL test if
it passes the weak LIL test at point n or at point 2n. Thus the
total probability is the sum of these two probabilities minus
the probability that the sequence passes the weak LIL test at
both points at the same time. The theorem is then proved. 
Example 5.6: For α = 0.1 (respectively α = 0.05) and ℵi =
{2i+26} with 0 ≤ i < j ≤ 8, the entry at (ℵi,ℵ j) in Table
I is the probability that a random sequence passes the weak
(0.1,ℵi ∪ℵ j)-LIL test (respectively, (0.05,ℵi ∪ℵi+1)-LIL test).
Proof. The probability could be calculated using either
equation (20) or (21) in Theorem 5.5 with θ = 1 − α. Our
analysis shows that results from (20) and (21) have a difference
6TABLE I
Weak (0.1,ℵ)-LIL and (0.05,ℵ)-LIL test probabilities
α ℵ0 ℵ1 ℵ2 ℵ3 ℵ4 ℵ5 ℵ6 ℵ7 ℵ8
α = 0.1
ℵ0 0.03044 0.05085 0.05441 0.05540 0.05544 0.05507 0.05453 0.05394 0.05334
ℵ1 0.02938 0.04918 0.05263 0.05361 0.05365 0.05331 0.05281 0.05226
ℵ2 0.02838 0.04762 0.05097 0.05193 0.05199 0.05168 0.05121
ℵ3 0.02746 0.04616 0.04942 0.05036 0.05043 0.05014
ℵ4 0.02661 0.04479 0.04797 0.04888 0.04897
ℵ5 0.02580 0.04351 0.04660 0.04750
ℵ6 0.02505 0.04230 0.04531
ℵ7 0.02434 0.04116
ℵ8 0.02367
α = 0.05
ℵ0 0.02234 0.03770 0.04016 0.04074 0.04065 0.04029 0.03983 0.03935 0.03886
ℵ1 0.02148 0.03633 0.03871 0.03928 0.03921 0.03888 0.03845 0.03799
ℵ2 0.02068 0.03506 0.03737 0.03792 0.03786 0.03756 0.03716
ℵ3 0.01995 0.03387 0.03611 0.03666 0.03661 0.03632
ℵ4 0.01926 0.03277 0.03494 0.03547 0.03544
ℵ5 0.01862 0.03173 0.03384 0.03437
ℵ6 0.01802 0.03076 0.03281
ℵ7 0.01746 0.02985
ℵ8 0.01693
smaller than 0.000000001 which is negligible. The values in
Table I are computed using the equation (20) and then verified
using the equation (21). 
VI. Weak-LIL test design II
In this section, we consider the design of weak (α,ℵ)-
LIL test with ℵ consisting at least three points. To be
consistent with Section V, we use the following notations:
ℵ0 = {20n1}, · · ·, and ℵt = {2tn1} for given n1 and t. In
particular, we will consider the cases for n1 = 226.
Theorem 6.1: For fixed 0 < α < 1 and t1, t2 ≥ 2, let θ =
1 − α, ℵ = {n, t1n, t1t2n}, and ℵa = {n, t1n}. Then we have
P(α,ℵ) ' P(α,ℵa)+
1
2pi
√
2pi(t1 − 1)
∫
C1
∫
C2
∫
C3
e−
x2+y2
2 − (z−y)
2
2(t1−1) dxdydz
(24)
where
C1 =
[
−θ
√
2t1 ln ln t1n, θ
√
2t1 ln ln t1n
]
C2 =
[
−θ√2 ln ln n, θ√2 ln ln n
]
C3 =
√ 1t2 − 1(θ√2t2 ln ln t2t1n − z/√t1),∞
 .
Proof. By symmetry, it suffices to show that
Prob
[
S lil(ξ |` t1t2n) ≥ θ|Eα,ℵa
]
' 1
2pi
√
2pi(t1 − 1)
∫
C1
∫
C2
∫
C3
e−
x2+y2
2 − (z−y)
2
2(t1−1) dxdydz
(25)
By Corollary 5.3, the probability that S lil(ξ |` t1n) ∈ [z, z+∆z]
and S lil(ξ |` t1t2n) > θ is approximately
P(z,∆z,t1n) ·
∫ ∞√
2
t2−1 (θ
√
t2 ln ln t2t1n−z
√
ln ln t1n)
ϕ(x)dx (26)
where P(z,∆z,t1n) is the probability that S lil(ξ |` t1n) ∈ [z, z + ∆z].
Let ∆1 =
√
2t1 ln ln t1n · ∆z. By equation (22) in the proof of
Theorem 5.5, the probability P(z,∆z,t1n) under the conditional
event “|S lil(ξ |` n)| < θ” is approximately
P(z,∆z,t1n) '
1
2pi
∫
C2
∫ z√2t1 ln ln t1n+∆1−y√
t1−1
z
√
2t1 ln ln t1n−y√
t1−1
e−
x2+y2
2 dxdy
'
∫
C2
ϕ(y)ϕ
(
z
√
2t1 ln ln t1n − y√
t1 − 1
)
∆1√
t1 − 1
dy
' ∆1√
t1 − 1
∫
C2
ϕ(y) · ϕ
(
z
√
2t1 ln ln t1n − y√
t1 − 1
)
dy
(27)
By substituting (27) into (26), replacing z
√
2t1 ln ln t1n with
w, and integrating the obtained equation (27) over the interval
w ∈ [−θ
√
2t1 ln ln t1n, θ
√
2t1 ln ln t1n], and finally replacing the
variable w back to z, equation (25) is obtained. The theorem
is then proved. 
Example 6.2: Let n1 = 226. By equation (24) in Theorem
6.1, we can calculate the following probabilities:
1) P(0.1,ℵ0∪ℵ3∪ℵ6) = 0.07755;
2) P(0.1,ℵ0∪ℵ3∪ℵ8) = 0.07741;
3) P(0.1,ℵ0∪ℵ6∪ℵ8) = 0.07417;
4) P(0.1,ℵ3∪ℵ6∪ℵ8) = 0.06995;
5) P(0.05,ℵ0∪ℵ4∪ℵ8) = 0.05645;
By trying all different combinations, it can be shown that for
any ℵ = ℵi1 ∪ℵi2 ∪ℵi3 with different 0 ≤ i1, i2, i3 ≤ 8, we have
0.069 ≤ P0.1,ℵ ≤ 0.08 and 0.05 ≤ P0.05,ℵ ≤ 0.06.
Theorem 6.1 provides an algorithm for computing the
probability Pα,ℵ when ℵ contains three points. By recursively
applying Corollary 5.3 as in the proof of Theorem 6.1, we can
obtain algorithms for calculating the probability Pα,ℵ when ℵ
contains more than three points. The process is straightfor-
7ward though tedious and the details are omitted here. In the
following, we give an alternative approach to approximate the
probability P(α,ℵ) with |ℵ|> 3 by using Theorems 5.5 and 6.1.
We show the approximation technique with the example of
α = 0.1 and ℵ = ℵ0 ∪ ℵ3 ∪ ℵ6 ∪ ℵ8. First we note that
P(α,ℵ) = P(α,ℵ0∪ℵ3∪ℵ6) + P(α,ℵ8)
−Prob [E(α,ℵ8) ∩ E(α,ℵ0∪ℵ3∪ℵ6)] (28)
Since
E(α,ℵ8) ∩ E(α,ℵ0∪ℵ3∪ℵ6) = (E(α,ℵ8) ∩ E(α,ℵ0))
∪(E(α,ℵ8) ∩ E(α,ℵ3)) ∪ (E(α,ℵ8) ∩ E(α,ℵ6))
we have
Prob
[
E(α,ℵ8) ∩ E(α,ℵ0∪ℵ3∪ℵ6)
]
= Prob
[
E(α,ℵ0) ∩ E(α,ℵ8)
]
+ Prob
[
E(α,ℵ3) ∩ E(α,ℵ8)
]
+Prob
[
E(α,ℵ6) ∩ E(α,ℵ8)
]
−Prob [E(α,ℵ0) ∩ E(α,ℵ3) ∩ E(α,ℵ8)]
−Prob [E(α,ℵ0) ∩ E(α,ℵ6) ∩ E(α,ℵ8)]
−Prob [E(α,ℵ3) ∩ E(α,ℵ6) ∩ E(α,ℵ8)]
+2 · Prob [E(α,ℵ0) ∩ E(α,ℵ3) ∩ E(α,ℵ6) ∩ E(α,ℵ8)]
(29)
Let ε = Prob
[
E(α,ℵ0) ∩ E(α,ℵ3) ∩ E(α,ℵ6) ∩ E(α,ℵ8)
]
. By substitut-
ing (29) into (28) and simplifying it, we get
P(α,ℵ) =
∑
i∈{0,3,6,8} P(α,ℵi)
+
∑
i1,i2,i3∈{0,3,6,8} P(α,ℵi1∪ℵi2∪ℵi3 )
−∑i1,i2∈{0,3,6,8} P(α,ℵi1∪ℵi2 ) − 2ε
' 0.09662 − 2ε
(30)
On the other hand, we have
2ε < 2 · Prob [E(α,ℵ3) ∩ E(α,ℵ6) ∩ E(α,ℵ8)]
= P(α,ℵ3∪ℵ6∪ℵ8) +
∑
i∈{3,6,8} P(α,ℵi)
−∑i1,i2∈{3,6,8} P(α,ℵi1∪ℵi2 )
' 0.00032
Thus we have 0.09630 < P(α,ℵ) < 0.09662. In other words, a
random sequence passes the weak (0.1,ℵ0∪ℵ3∪ℵ6∪ℵ8)-LIL
test with approximately 9.65% probability.
VII. Strong LIL test design
This section considers the following strong LIL tests.
Strong LIL Test: Let α ∈ (0, 0.25] and ℵa,ℵb,ℵc ⊂ N be
subsets of natural numbers. We say that a sequence ξ passes
the strong (α;ℵa,ℵb)-LIL test if there exist n1 ∈ ℵa and n2 ∈
ℵb such that
|S lil(ξ |` ni)| > 1 − α for i = 1, 2;
S lil(ξ |` n1)S lil(ξ |` n2) < 0.
(31)
Alternatively, we say that a sequence ξ passes the strong
(α;ℵc)-LIL test if there exist n1, n2 ∈ ℵc such that (31) holds.
Furthermore, SP(α;ℵa,ℵb) and SP(α;ℵc) denote the probability
that a random sequence passes the strong (α;ℵa,ℵb)-LIL and
(α;ℵc)-LIL tests respectively.
Theorem 7.1: For fixed 0 < α < 1 and t ≥ 2, let θ = 1 − α,
ℵa = {n}, and ℵb = {tn}. We have
SP(α,ℵa,ℵb) '
1
pi
∫ ∞
θ
√
2 ln ln n
∫ −√ 1t−1 (θ√2t ln ln tn+y)
−∞
e−
x2+y2
2 dxdy
(32)
Proof. The theorem could be proved in a similar way as in the
proof of Theorem 5.5. 
Example 7.2: Let α = 0.1, ℵ0 = {226}, ℵ7 = {233}, and ℵ8 =
{234}. Then we have SP(α,ℵ0,ℵ7) ' 0.0001981 and SP(α,ℵ0,ℵ8) '
0.0002335
In the following, we provide another approach for obtaining
better probability bounds for strong LIL tests. In a negative
binomial distribution f (k; r, 12 ) denote the probability that the
rth one appears at the position r + k. It is well known that for
this distribution, we have mean µ = r and variance σ =
√
2r.
Thus the probability that the r’s one appears before the nth
position is approximated by the following probability:
1
2
√
rpi
∫ n
−∞
e−
(x−2r)2
4r dx (33)
For n1 = 226 and n2 = 234, assume that S lil(ξ |` n1) ≤ −y for
given y ≥ θ. Then we have
S (ξ |` n1) ≤ n1 − y
√
2n1 ln ln n1
2
(34)
By (34), in order for S lil(ξ |` n2) ≥ θ, we need to have
(35)
r(y) = S (ξ[n1..n2 − 1])
≥ n2 + θ
√
2n2 ln ln n2 − n1 + y
√
2n1 ln ln n1
2
Let α = 1 − θ, ℵa = {n1}, and ℵb = {n2}. Using the same
argument as in the proof of Theorem 5.5 (in particular, the
arguments for integrating equation (23)) and the negative bino-
mial distribution equation (33), the probability that a sequence
passes the strong (α;ℵa,ℵb)-LIL test can be calculated with
the following equation.
1
pi
∫ −θ√2 ln ln n1
−∞
∫ n2−n1
−∞
1√
2r(y)
e−
y2
2 − (x−2r(y))
2
4r(y) dxdy (36)
By substituting the values of θ, n1, and n2, (36) evaluates
to 0.0002335. In other words, a random sequence passes
the strong (0.1;ℵ0,ℵ8)-LIL test with probability 0.023% (this
value is same as the value in Example 7.2).
Both (32) and (36) could be used to calculate the probability
for strong LIL tests. These equations could be used to gener-
alize results in Example 7.2 to cases of strong (α;ℵa,ℵb)-LIL
test with multiple points in ℵb.
VIII. Evaluating Pseudorandom Generators
In order to evaluate the quality of a pseudorandom generator
G, we first choose a fixed n of sequence length, a value
0 < α ≤ 0.1, and mutually distinct subsets ℵ0, · · · ,ℵt of
8{1, · · · , n}. It is preferred that the S lil values on these subsets
are as independent as possible (though they are impossible to
be independent). For example, we may choose ℵi as in Section
VI. Then we can carry out the following steps.
1) Set P+(α,ℵ) = P
−
(α,ℵ) =
1
2 P(α,ℵ) for all ℵ.
2) Use G to construct a set of m ≥ 100 binary sequences
of length n.
3) For each ℵ, calculate probability P+(α,ℵ) that these se-
quences pass the weak (α,ℵi)-LIL test via S lil ≥ 1 − α
(respectively, P−(α,ℵ) for S lil ≤ −1 + α).
4) Calculate the average absolute probability distance
∆wlil =
1
t + 1
t∑
i=0
P−1(α,ℵi)
(∣∣∣P+(α,ℵi) − P+(α,ℵi)∣∣∣ + ∣∣∣P−(α,ℵi)
− P−(α,ℵi)
∣∣∣)
and the root-mean-square deviation
RMSDwlil =
√∑
0≤i≤ j≤t
(
p2i, j,1 + p
2
i, j,2
)
(t + 1)(t + 2)
where p+i, j,1 = P
+
(α,ℵi∪ℵ j)−P+(α,ℵi∪ℵ j) and p+i, j,2 = P−(α,ℵi∪ℵ j)−
P−(α,ℵi∪ℵ j)
5) Decision criteria: the smaller ∆wlil and RMSDwlil, the
better generator G.
IX. Snapshot LIL tests and random generator evaluation
We have considered statistical tests based on the limit
theorem of the law of the iterated logarithm. These tests do
not take full advantage of the distribution S lil, which defines
a probability measure on the real line R. Let R ⊂ Σn be a set
of m sequences with a standard probability definition on it.
That is, for each x0 ∈ R, let Prob[x = x0] = 1m . Then each setR ⊂ Σn induces a probability measure µRn on R by letting
µRn (I) = Prob [S lil(x) ∈ I, x ∈ R]
for each Lebesgue measurable set I on R. For U = Σn,
we use µUn to denote the corresponding probability measure
induced by the uniform distribution. By Definition 2.2, if Rn
is the collection of all length n sequences generated by a
pseudorandom generator, then the difference between µUn and
µRnn is negligible.
By Theorem 4.3 and Lemma 4.4, for a uniformly chosen ξ,
the distribution of S ∗(ξ |` n) could be approximated by a normal
distribution of mean 0 and variance 1, with error bounded by
1
n (see [7]). In other words, the measure µ
U
n can be calculated
as
(37)
µUn ((−∞, x]) ' Φ(x
√
2 ln ln n)
=
√
2 ln ln n
∫ x
−∞
φ(y
√
2 ln ln n)dy.
Table V in the Appendix lists values µUn (I) for 0.05-length
intervals I with n = 226, · · · , 234.
In order to evaluate a pseudorandom generator G, first
choose a sequence of testing points n0, · · · , nt (e.g., n0 = 226+t).
Secondly use G to generate a set R ⊆ Σnt of m sequences.
Lastly compare the distances between the two probability
measures µRn and µUn for n = n0, · · · , nt.
A generator G is considered “good”, if for sufficiently
large m, the distances between µRn and µUn are negligible (or
smaller than a given threshold). There are various definitions of
statistical distances for probability measures. In our analysis,
we will consider the total variation distance [4]
d(µRn , µ
U
n ) = sup
A⊆B
∣∣∣µRn (A) − µUn (A)∣∣∣ (38)
Hellinger distance [11]
H(µRn ||µUn ) =
1√
2
√∑
A∈B
(√
µRn (A) −
√
µUn (A)
)2
(39)
and the root-mean-square deviation
(40)RMSD(µRn , µ
U
n ) =
√∑
A∈B
(
µRn (A) − µUn (A)
)2
42
where B is a partition of the real line R that is defined as
{(∞, 1), [1,∞)} ∪ {[0.05x − 1, 0.05x − 0.95) : 0 ≤ x ≤ 39} .
In Section X, we will present some examples of using these
distance to evaluate several pseudorandom generators.
X. Experimental results
As an example to illustrate the importance of LIL tests,
we carry out weak LIL test experiments on pseudorandom
generators SHA1PRNG (Java) and NIST DRBG [17] with
parameters α = 0.1 (and 0.05) and ℵ0 = {226}, · · · ,ℵ8 = {234}
(note that 226bits= 8MB and 234bits= 2GB).
Before carrying out LIL based tests, we run NIST SP800-22
test tool [15] on sequences that have been generated. The test
tool [15] only checks the first 1,215,752,192 bits ('145MB)
of a sequences since the software uses 4-byte int data type
for integer variables. The initial 145MB of each sequence that
we have generated passes NIST tests with P-values larger than
0.01 except for the “longest run of ones in a block” test which
failed for several sequences.
A. Java SHA1PRNG API based sequences
The pseudorandom generator SHA1PRNG API in Java
generates sequences SHA1′(s, 0)SHA1′(s, 1) · · ·, where s is an
optional seeding string of arbitrary length, the counter i is 64
bits long, and SHA1′(s, i) is the first 64 bits of SHA1(s, i). In
the experiment, we generated one thousand of sequences with
four-byte seeds of integers 0, 1, 2, · · · , 999 respectively. For
each sequence generation, the “random.nextBytes()” method
of SecureRandom Class is called 226 times and a 32-byte
output is requested for each call. This produces sequences of
234 bits long. The LIL test is then run on these sequences and
the first picture in Figure 1 shows the LIL-test result curves
for the first 100 sequences. To reduce the size of the figure, we
use the scale 10000n2 for the x-axis. In other words, Figure 1
shows the values S lil(ξ[0..10000n2 − 1]) for 1 ≤ n ≤ 1310. At
this scale, the points ℵ0, · · · ,ℵ8 are mapped to 82, 116, 164,
9Fig. 1. LIL test results for sequences generated by Java SHA1PRNG, NIST
SP800 90A SHA1-DRBG, and NIST SP800 90A SHA2-DRBG
232, 328, 463, 655, 927, and 1310 respectively. Table II shows
the number of sequences that reach the value 0.9, -0.9, 0.95,
and -0.95 at corresponding testing points respectively.
Using the partition set B, the probability distributions
µJavaS HA1n with n = 2
26, · · · , 234 are presented in the Appendix
Table VI. Figure 2 compares these distributions.
Fig. 2. The distributions µUn and µ
JavaS HA1
n with n = 2
26, · · · , 234
TABLE II
Number of sequences that pass the LIL values 0.9 and 0.95
ℵ ℵ0 ℵ1 ℵ2 ℵ3 ℵ4 ℵ5 ℵ6 ℵ7 ℵ8
n 82 116 164 232 328 463 655 927 1310
Java SHA1PRNG
0.9 20 16 20 20 16 14 17 11 11
−0.9 18 20 18 17 14 11 12 11 9
0.95 14 12 13 18 12 10 15 7 8
−0.95 13 13 14 9 10 7 9 8 6
NIST SP800 90A SHA1-DRBG at sample size 1000
0.9 15 16 15 12 8 9 17 10 8
−0.9 15 19 12 18 10 16 14 9 ‘2
0.95 10 9 12 10 5 5 11 6 6
−0.95 11 12 8 13 8 10 10 7 12
NIST SP800 90A SHA256-DRBG at sample size 1000
0.9 13 16 14 20 13 15 21 16 9
−0.9 16 13 14 5 13 9 11 13 10
0.95 9 10 12 15 9 10 16 14 3
−0.95 13 9 8 4 8 6 9 12 9
NIST SP800 90A SHA256-DRBG at sample size 10000
0.9 164 157 162 145 128 128 133 121 114
−0.9 154 142 142 130 123 128 123 120 107
0.95 120 107 127 110 89 93 93 84 70
−0.95 107 106 92 99 91 93 95 84 78
B. NIST SP800 90A DRBG pseudorandom generators
NIST SP800.90A [2] specifies three types of DRBG genera-
tors: hash function based, block cipher based, and ECC based.
For DRBG generators, the maximum number of calls between
reseeding is 248 for hash function and AES based generators
(the number is 232 for T-DES and ECC-DRBG generators). In
our experiment, we used hash function based DRBG. where
a hash function G is used to generate sequences G(V)G(V +
1)G(V + 2) · · · with V being seedlen-bit counter that is derived
from the secret seeds. The seedlen is 440 for SHA1 and SHA-
256 and the value of V is revised after at most 219 bits are
output. We generated 10000 sequences nistSHADRBG0, · · ·,
nistSHADRBG9999. For each sequence nistSHADRBGi, the
seed “ith secret seed for NIST DRBG" is used to derive the
initial DRBG state V0 and C0. Each sequence is of the format
G(V0)G(V0) · · ·G(V0 +212−1)G(V1)G(V1 +1) · · ·G(V225 +212−
1), where Vi+1 is derived from the value of Vi and Ci. In other
words, each V is used 212 times before it is revised. The second
picture (respectively, the third picture) in Figure 1 shows the
LIL-test result curves for the first 100 sequences when SHA1
(respectively, SHA256) is used as the hash function and Table
II shows the number of sequences that reach the value 0.9, -0.9,
0.95, and -0.95 at corresponding testing points respectively.
The probability distributions µnistDRBGsha1,1000n ,
µnistDRBGsha256,1000n , and µ
nistDRBGsha256,10000
n on partition B
are presented in Appendix Tables VII, VIII, IX respectively.
Figure 3 compares the distributions µnistDRBGsha1n at the sample
size 1000. The comparisons for µnistDRBGsha256n are presented
in Appendix Figure 5 and 6.
C. Comparison and Discussion
Based on Table II, the average absolute probability distance
∆wlil and the root-mean-square deviation RMSDwlil at the
sample size 1000 (for DRBG-SHA256, we also include results
for sample size 10000) are calculated and shown in Table III.
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TABLE III
The probability distances ∆wlil and RMSDwlil
Java SHA1PRNG DRBG-SHA1 DRBG-SHA256 (1000) DRBG-SHA256 (10000)
∆wlil,0.1 0.140 0.194 0.200 0.045
∆wlil,0.05 0.276 0.224 0.289 0.063
RMSDwlil,0.1 0.004647 0.003741 0.004984 0.00118
RMSDwlil,0.05 0.004042 0.003023 0.004423 0.001107
Fig. 3. The distributions µUn and µ
nistDRBGsha1
n with n = 2
26, · · · , 234
These values are quite large.
Based on snapshot LIL tests at points 226, · · · , 234, the corre-
sponding total variation distance d(µRn , µUn ), Hellinger distance
H(µRn ||µUn ), and the root-mean-square deviation RMSD(µRn , µUn )
at sample size 1000 (also DRBG-SHA256 at sample size
10,000) are calculated and shown in Table IV, where subscripts
1, 2, 3, 4 are for JavaSHA1, nistDRBGsha1, nistDRBGsha256
(sample size 1000), and nistDRBGsha256 (sample size 10000)
respectively. It is observed that at the sample size 1000, the
average distance between µRn and µUn is larger than 0.06 and
the root-mean-square deviation is around 0.005.
TABLE IV
total variation and Hellinger distances
n 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234
d1 .074 .704 .064 .085 .067 .085 .074 .069 .071
H1 .062 .067 .063 .089 .066 .078 .077 .061 .068
RMSD1 .005 .005 .004 .005 .004 .006 .005 .005 .005
d2 .066 .072 .079 .067 .084 .073 .065 .078 .083
H2 .060 .070 .073 .062 .077 .066 .067 .070 .087
RMSD2 .004 .005 .005 .004 .005 .004 .004 .005 .005
d3 .076 .069 .072 .093 .071 .067 .078 .081 .066
H3 .082 .064 .068 .088 .079 .073 .076 .074 .080
RMSD3 .005 .004 .004 .006 .004 .004 .005 .005 .005
d4 .021 .022 .026 .024 .022 .024 .026 .024 .021
H4 .019 .021 .024 .024 .022 .023 .025 .022 .021
RMSD4 .001 .001 .002 .001 .001 .002 .002 .002 .001
Though the statistical distances in Tables III and IV may
be acceptable for various applications, for a cryptographic ran-
dom source at the sample size “1000 of 2GB-long sequences”,
it is expected to have a statistical distance smaller than 0.03
and an RMSD smaller than 0.001 for the standard normal
distribution µUn (see, e.g., [8]). At sample size 10000 of 2GB
sequences, the statistical distance is reduced to 0.02 which is
still more than acceptable for cryptographic applications.
One could also visually analyze the pictures in Figure
1. For example, from three pictures in Figure 1, we may
get the following impression: sequences generated by Java
SHA1PRNG have a good performance to stay within the
interval [−1, 1] though there is a big gap between 400 and
900 in the bottom area that is close to the line y = −1. Among
the three pictures, sequences generated by SHA1-DRBG have
a better performance that looks more close to a true random
source. For sequences generated by SHA2-DRBG, too many
sequences reach or go beyond y = 1 and y = −1 lines.
XI. Conclusion
This paper proposed statistical distance based LIL testing
techniques and showed that, at sample size 1000, the col-
lection of sequences generated by several commonly used
pseudorandom generators has a statistical distance 0.06 and
root-mean-square deviation 0.005 from a true random source.
These values are larger than expected for various cryptographic
applications. This paper also calculated the probability for
weak LIL tests on sequences of less than 2GB. For longer
sequences, the corresponding probabilities decrease signifi-
cantly. Thus large sample sizes of sequences are needed for
better LIL testing. Alternatively, one may also split longer
sequences into independent sub-sequences of 2GB each and
then use the probabilities calculated in this paper to carry
out LIL testing on them. For strong LIL tests, this paper
obtained a preliminary result with a very small probability
for a random sequence to pass. It would be interesting to
calculate the exact probability SP(α,ℵ) for continuous interval
ℵ (e.g., ℵ = [226, 234]). We believe that SP(α,ℵ) is large enough
for a reasonable interval ℵ such as ℵ = [226, 234]. When the
probability SP(α,ℵ) becomes larger, the required sample size for
the strong LIL testing will be smaller. It would also be very
important to find new techniques that could be used to design
pseudorandom generators with smaller statistical distance and
smaller root-mean-square deviation from a true random source.
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XII. Appendix
Figure 4 shows the distributions of µUn for n = 2
26, · · · , 234
and Table V lists values µUn (I) on B with n = 226, · · · , 234.
Fig. 4. Density functions for distributions µUn with n = 2
26, · · · , 234
Since µUn (I) is symmetric, it is sufficient to list the distribution
in the positive side of the real line.
Table VI lists values µJavaS HA1n (I) on B with n = 226, · · · , 234.
Table VII lists values µnistDRBsha1n (I) on B with n =
226, · · · , 234.
Table VIII lists values µnistDRBGsha256,1000n (I) on B with n =
226, · · · , 234.
Figure 5 compared the distributions µnistDRBGsha256,1000n .
Fig. 5. The distributions µUn and µ
nistDRBGsha256,1000
n with n = 226, · · · , 234
Table VIII lists values µnistDRBGsha256,10000n (I) on B with n =
226, · · · , 234.
Figure 6 compared the distributions µnistDRBGsha256n .
Fig. 6. The distributions µUn and µ
nistDRBGsha256,10000
n with n = 226, · · · , 234
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TABLE V
The distribution µUn induced by S lil for n = 2
26, · · · , 234 (due to symmetry, only distribution on the positive part of real line R is given)
226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234
[0.00, 0.05) .047854 .048164 .048460 .048745 .049018 .049281 .049534 .049778 .050013
[0.05, 0.10) .047168 .047464 .047748 .048020 .048281 .048532 .048773 .049006 .049230
[0.10, 0.15) .045825 .046096 .046354 0.04660 .046839 .047067 .047287 .047498 .047701
[0.15, 0.20) .043882 .044116 .044340 .044553 .044758 .044953 .045141 .045322 .045496
[0.20, 0.25) .041419 .041609 .041789 .041961 .042125 .042282 .042432 .042575 .042713
[0.25, 0.30) .038534 .038674 .038807 .038932 .039051 .039164 .039272 .039375 .039473
[0.30, 0.35) .035336 .035424 .035507 .035584 .035657 .035725 0.03579 .035850 .035907
[0.35, 0.40) .031939 .031976 .032010 .032041 .032068 .032093 .032115 .032135 .032153
[0.40, 0.45) .028454 .028445 .028434 .028421 .028407 .028392 .028375 .028358 .028340
[0.45, 0.50) .024986 .024936 .024886 .024835 .024785 .024735 .024686 .024637 .024588
[0.50, 0.55) .021627 .021542 .021460 .021379 .021300 .021222 .021146 .021072 .020999
[0.55, 0.60) .018450 .018340 .018234 .018130 .018029 .017931 .017836 .017743 .017653
[0.60, 0.65) .015515 .015388 .015265 .015146 .015032 .014921 .014813 .014709 .014608
[0.65, 0.70) .012859 .012723 .012591 .012465 .012344 .012227 .012114 .012004 .011899
[0.70, 0.75) .010506 .010367 .010234 .010106 .009984 .009867 .009754 .009645 .009541
[0.75, 0.80) .008460 .008324 .008195 .008072 .007954 .007841 .007733 .007629 .007530
[0.80, 0.85) .006714 .006587 .006466 .006351 .006241 .006137 .006037 .005941 .005850
[0.85, 0.90) .005253 .005137 .005027 .004923 .004824 .004730 .004640 .004555 .004474
[0.90, 0.95) .004050 .003948 .003851 .003759 .003672 .003590 .003512 .003438 .003368
[0.95, 1.00) .003079 .002990 .002906 .002828 .002754 .002684 .002617 .002555 .002495
[1.00,∞) .008090 .007750 .007437 .007147 .006877 .006627 .006393 .006175 .005970
TABLE VI
The distribution µJavaS HA1n induced by S lil for n = 2
26, · · · , 234
226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234
(−∞,−1) .011 .008 .012 .007 .006 .006 .008 .006 .004
[−0.1,−0.95) .002 .005 .002 .002 .004 .001 .001 .002 .002
[−0.95,−0.90) .005 .007 .004 .008 .004 .004 .003 .003 .003
[−0.90,−0.85) .008 .005 .006 .003 .008 .005 .001 .003 .007
[−0.85,−0.80) .007 .011 .006 .005 .007 .006 .003 .004 .006
[−0.80,−0.75) .010 .006 .010 .011 .010 .005 .003 .008 .006
[−0.75,−0.70) .015 .010 .013 .010 .002 .004 .013 .011 .012
[−0.70,−0.65) .013 .017 .010 .007 .010 .006 .011 .009 .009
[−0.65,−0.60) .019 .017 .013 .013 .011 .017 .011 .013 .007
[−0.60,−0.55) .014 .021 .015 .022 .019 .018 .017 .022 .017
[−0.55,−0.50) .020 .032 .024 .019 .022 .022 .021 .021 .020
[−0.50,−0.45) .030 .030 .027 .028 .024 .022 .027 .025 .022
[−0.45,−0.40) .034 .035 .037 .021 .025 .020 .031 .033 .037
[−0.40,−0.35) .036 .035 .037 .038 .033 .037 .032 .039 .032
[−0.35,−0.30) .042 .037 .044 .031 .034 .035 .035 .033 .042
[−0.30,−0.25) .043 .033 .042 .039 .032 .043 .046 .040 .041
[−0.25,−0.20) .042 .039 .040 .053 .048 .039 .047 .039 .048
[−0.20,−0.15) .053 .047 .042 .049 .052 .042 .039 .038 .029
[−0.15,−0.10) .055 .045 .049 .056 .053 .038 .048 .052 .043
[−0.10,−.05) .047 .046 .051 .049 .046 .054 .041 .049 .053
[−.05, 0) .040 .037 .048 .047 .045 .055 .053 .059 .048
[0, .05) .042 .046 .050 .053 .041 .041 .041 .045 .044
[.05, 0.10) .039 .053 .048 .048 .043 .050 .049 .038 .049
[0.10, 0.15) .040 .054 .039 .049 .058 .064 .039 .050 .054
[0.15, 0.20) .042 .047 .039 .047 .051 .058 .064 .041 .038
[0.20, 0.25) .034 .030 .029 .031 .040 .053 .050 .049 .040
[0.25, 0.30) .027 .036 .040 .032 .041 .033 .039 .040 .044
[0.30, 0.35) .034 .027 .034 .033 .043 .022 .033 .040 .040
[0.35, 0.40) .026 .033 .030 .043 .030 .030 .030 .022 .038
[0.40, 0.45) .030 .030 .016 .024 .030 .026 .034 .022 .031
[0.45, 0.50) .020 .021 .023 .028 .019 .033 .028 .022 .021
[0.50, 0.55) .020 .018 .018 .008 .025 .024 .013 .026 .018
[0.55, 0.60) .019 .012 .020 .020 .017 .020 .022 .015 .023
[0.60, 0.65) .015 .015 .014 .009 .015 .015 .015 .017 .019
[0.65, 0.70) .011 .013 .014 .008 .010 .008 .009 .015 .013
[0.70, 0.75) .009 .005 .011 .013 .008 .009 .009 .015 .012
[0.75, 0.80) .011 .009 .007 .004 .006 .009 .009 .006 .003
[0.80, 0.85) .007 .008 .009 .004 .008 .009 .002 .009 .007
[0.85, 0.90) .008 .004 .007 .008 .004 .003 .006 .008 .007
[0.90, 0.95) .006 .004 .007 .002 .004 .004 .002 .004 .003
[0.95, 1.00) .003 .004 .002 .010 .002 .004 .004 .002 .002
[1.00,∞) .011 .008 .011 .008 .010 .006 .011 .005 .006
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TABLE VII
The distribution µnistDRBGsha1n induced by S lil for n = 2
26, · · · , 234
226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234
(−∞,−1) .009 .008 .007 .008 .006 .007 .007 .006 .007
[−0.1,−0.95) .002 .004 .001 .005 .002 .003 .003 .001 .005
[−0.95,−0.90) .004 .007 .004 .005 .002 .006 .004 .002 .000
[−0.90,−0.85) .009 .006 .011 .008 .005 .003 .006 .006 .009
[−0.85,−0.80) .005 .010 .004 .010 .008 .003 .004 .010 .003
[−0.80,−0.75) .007 .004 .010 .011 .006 .008 .011 .005 .002
[−0.75,−0.70) .009 .005 .014 .008 .011 .017 .007 .013 .011
[−0.70,−0.65) .019 .014 .014 .011 .026 .015 .012 .013 .009
[−0.65,−0.60) .013 .020 .010 .012 .018 .011 .014 .012 .011
[−0.60,−0.55) .016 .021 .019 .014 .019 .022 .021 .018 .017
[−0.55,−0.50) .022 .018 .022 .027 .028 .022 .023 .023 .023
[−0.50,−0.45) .027 .025 .020 .033 .021 .029 .025 .026 .034
[−0.45,−0.40) .028 .030 .024 .027 .025 .033 .034 .028 .035
[−0.40,−0.35) .030 .036 .031 .026 .027 .026 .037 .041 .036
[−0.35,−0.30) .041 .032 .037 .035 .032 .026 .040 .039 .038
[−0.30,−0.25) .034 .043 .052 .038 .039 .032 .034 .032 .048
[−0.25,−0.20) .045 .031 .048 .038 .038 .046 .036 .030 .044
[−0.20,−0.15) .055 .044 .048 .039 .039 .042 .046 .051 .050
[−0.15,−0.10) .056 .058 .046 .046 .041 .050 .046 .050 .042
[−0.10,−0.05) .046 .048 .048 .044 .044 .051 .046 .059 .039
[−0.05, 0) .045 .050 .035 .051 .040 .053 .048 .059 .048
[0, 0.05) .045 .040 .051 .052 .047 .041 .033 .044 .042
[0.05, 0.10) .058 .038 .060 .047 .056 .044 .044 .056 .051
[0.10, 0.15) .042 .044 .035 .041 .057 .047 .050 .040 .048
[0.15, 0.20) .037 .040 .040 .051 .039 .049 .045 .038 .033
[0.20, 0.25) .034 .050 .037 .056 .045 .039 .046 .039 .033
[0.25, 0.30) .042 .041 .034 .046 .042 .032 .037 .039 .035
[0.30, 0.35) .036 .036 .040 .035 .036 .031 .043 .037 .040
[0.35, 0.40) .022 .038 .028 .033 .045 .029 .043 .032 .038
[0.40, 0.45) .029 .020 .026 .023 .037 .036 .031 .018 .034
[0.45, 0.50) .025 .026 .028 .023 .019 .029 .020 .019 .026
[0.50, 0.55) .024 .025 .034 .019 .012 .031 .024 .023 .031
[0.55, 0.60) .020 .012 .016 .015 .023 .020 .019 .022 .014
[0.60, 0.65) .010 .016 .011 .014 .013 .019 .011 .011 .015
[0.65, 0.70) .012 .013 .011 .008 .015 .012 .010 .013 .013
[0.70, 0.75) .006 .012 .011 .008 .012 .011 .011 .014 .006
[0.75, 0.80) .010 .011 .005 .012 .009 .006 .009 .006 .011
[0.80, 0.85) .006 .005 .006 .005 .006 .005 .002 .008 .006
[0.85, 0.90) .005 .003 .006 .003 .002 .005 .001 .007 .005
[0.90, 0.95) .005 .007 .003 .002 .003 .004 .006 .004 .002
[0.95, 1.00) .002 .004 .003 .004 .001 .001 .003 .001 .001
[1.00,∞) .008 .005 .010 .007 .004 .004 .008 .005 .005
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TABLE VIII
The distribution µnistDRBGsha256,1000n induced by S lil for n = 226, · · · , 234
226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234
(−∞,−1) .007 .005 .005 .002 .004 .003 .003 .009 .006
[−0.1,−0.95) .006 .004 .003 .002 .004 .003 .006 .003 .003
[−0.95,−0.90) .003 .004 .006 .001 .005 .003 .002 .001 .001
[−0.90,−0.85) .004 .006 .003 .005 .004 .005 .002 .005 .003
[−0.85,−0.80) .007 .006 .002 .013 .005 .007 .011 .005 .004
[−0.80,−0.75) .008 .010 .007 .006 .004 .008 .013 .007 .004
[−0.75,−0.70) .007 .010 .010 .013 .005 .004 .009 .010 .006
[−0.70,−0.65) .021 .013 .012 .015 .006 .018 .011 .010 .008
[−0.65,−0.60) .009 .008 .012 .015 .021 .009 .014 .019 .022
[−0.60,−0.55) .016 .019 .019 .018 .016 .008 .020 .012 .015
[−0.55,−0.50) .025 .013 .021 .016 .017 .023 .021 .013 .020
[−0.50,−0.45) .014 .033 .026 .023 .018 .015 .025 .034 .025
[−0.45,−0.40) .028 .024 .033 .023 .034 .034 .030 .026 .022
[−0.40,−0.35) .021 .025 .031 .034 .029 .036 .032 .033 .022
[−0.35,−0.30) .034 .031 .039 .043 .037 .040 .024 .031 .037
[−0.30,−0.25) .042 .041 .036 .027 .033 .031 .036 .041 .036
[−0.25,−0.20) .043 .046 .035 .030 .045 .039 .039 .037 .042
[−0.20,−0.15) .040 .042 .051 .047 .042 .044 .036 .042 .046
[−0.15,−0.10) .039 .042 .038 .050 .055 .044 .053 .043 .046
[−0.10,−0.05) .048 .046 .042 .055 .045 .050 .045 .042 .049
[−0.05, 0) .049 .045 .044 .043 .045 .049 .040 .063 .055
[0, 0.05) .055 .059 .050 .062 .049 .054 .056 .040 .043
[0.05, 0.10) .043 .041 .049 .044 .049 .045 .059 .060 .047
[0.10, 0.15) .046 .045 .036 .038 .045 .045 .042 .052 .052
[0.15, 0.20) .049 .046 .052 .040 .045 .049 .048 .047 .050
[0.20, 0.25) .054 .043 .033 .046 .046 .047 .033 .037 .043
[0.25, 0.30) .044 .050 .046 .041 .052 .039 .038 .040 .047
[0.30, 0.35) .037 .030 .032 .033 .035 .037 .034 .036 .054
[0.35, 0.40) .033 .028 .030 .040 .039 .033 .036 .049 .032
[0.40, 0.45) .025 .030 .036 .027 .024 .026 .029 .025 .033
[0.45, 0.50) .022 .031 .025 .043 .025 .032 .027 .028 .022
[0.50, 0.55) .023 .026 .021 .016 .027 .023 .018 .019 .020
[0.55, 0.60) .017 .017 .020 .012 .019 .017 .028 .020 .019
[0.60, 0.65) .024 .016 .018 .014 .025 .022 .018 .011 .015
[0.65, 0.70) .008 .016 .017 .009 .013 .017 .014 .007 .012
[0.70, 0.75) .013 .007 .016 .014 .006 .007 .014 .008 .016
[0.75, 0.80) .002 .009 .011 .010 .009 .011 .004 .008 .004
[0.80, 0.85) .011 .011 .012 .007 .001 .004 .005 .007 .007
[0.85, 0.90) .010 .006 .007 .003 .004 .004 .004 .004 .003
[0.90, 0.95) .004 .006 .002 .005 .004 .005 .005 .002 .006
[0.95, 1.00) .002 .003 .002 .007 .001 .002 .005 .003 .000
[1.00,∞) .007 .007 .010 .008 .008 .008 .011 .011 .003
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TABLE IX
The distribution µnistDRBGsha256,10000n induced by S lil for n = 226, · · · , 234
226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234
(−∞,−1) .0071 .0070 .0062 .0067 .0061 .0066 .0069 .0053 .0055
[−0.1,−0.95) .0036 .0036 .0030 .0032 .0030 .0027 .0026 .0031 .0023
[−0.95,−0.90) .0047 .0036 .0050 .0031 .0032 .0035 .0028 .0036 .0029
[−0.90,−0.85) .0044 .0057 .0060 .0035 .0039 .0047 .0038 .0043 .0035
[−0.85,−0.80) .0063 .0068 .0058 .0085 .0057 .0062 .0066 .0062 .0050
[−0.80,−0.75) .0089 .0078 .0090 .0082 .0071 .0057 .0083 .0071 .0070
[−0.75,−0.70) .0112 .0102 .0103 .0094 .0096 .0097 .0108 .0081 .0099
[−0.70,−0.65) .0126 .0128 .0118 .0118 .0118 .0113 .0104 .0123 .0120
[−0.65,−0.60) .0149 .0147 .0166 .0166 .0151 .0147 .0185 .0144 .0147
[−0.60,−0.55) .0180 .0217 .0179 .0181 .0191 .0180 .0165 .0169 .0199
[−0.55,−0.50) .0216 .0197 .0215 .0217 .0201 .0247 .0243 .0186 .0188
[−0.50,−0.45) .0228 .0275 .0245 .0228 .0226 .0220 .0250 .0246 .0255
[−0.45,−0.40) .0274 .0303 .0310 .0309 .0292 .0283 .0319 .0302 .0287
[−0.40,−0.35) .0302 .0298 .0322 .0331 .0315 .0326 .0323 .0354 .0336
[−0.35,−0.30) .0353 .0346 .0344 .0341 .0361 .0385 .0331 .0361 .0329
[−0.30,−0.25) .0394 .0385 .0365 .0379 .0391 .0408 .0381 .0375 .0387
[−0.25,−0.20) .0435 .0405 .0391 .0425 .0462 .0375 .0454 .0442 .0446
[−0.20,−0.15) .0419 .0436 .0430 .0430 .0450 .0488 .0431 .0429 .0453
[−0.15,−0.10) .0439 .0475 .0446 .0475 .0506 .0450 .0464 .0466 .0491
[−0.10,−0.05) .0474 .0426 .0516 .0484 .0480 .0499 .0474 .0511 .0501
[−0.05, 0) .0488 .0489 .0473 .0447 .0474 .0471 .0465 .0501 .0481
[0, 0.05) .0497 .0478 .0499 .0460 .0499 .0505 .0495 .0507 .0485
[0.05, 0.10) .0466 .0460 .0470 .0493 .0512 .0465 .0474 .0476 .0469
[0.10, 0.15) .0436 .0478 .0479 .0455 .0475 .0481 .0466 .0468 .0494
[0.15, 0.20) .0450 .0455 .0467 .0438 .0436 .0459 .0487 .0472 .0469
[0.20, 0.25) .0435 .0411 .0389 .0440 .0418 .0466 .0407 .0460 .0431
[0.25, 0.30) .0393 .0395 .0392 .0406 .0414 .0390 .0407 .0381 .0405
[0.30, 0.35) .0370 .0351 .0325 .0377 .0334 .0341 .0357 .0348 .0352
[0.35, 0.40) .0319 .0304 .0323 .0321 .0289 .0300 .0290 .0363 .0347
[0.40, 0.45) .0308 .0286 .0295 .0309 .0264 .0274 .0271 .0300 .0293
[0.45, 0.50) .0239 .0235 .0249 .0252 .0251 .0243 .0243 .0241 .0257
[0.50, 0.55) .0203 .0229 .0184 .0219 .0213 .0226 .0219 .0201 .0202
[0.55, 0.60) .0166 .0177 .0166 .0154 .0192 .0168 .0189 .0158 .0178
[0.60, 0.65) .0162 .0150 .0160 .0163 .0167 .0154 .0138 .0127 .0144
[0.65, 0.70) .0137 .0143 .0145 .0119 .0120 .0122 .0123 .0123 .0111
[0.70, 0.75) .0102 .0103 .0111 .0092 .0109 .0103 .0104 .0088 .0091
[0.75, 0.80) .0074 .0087 .0089 .0074 .0082 .0079 .0084 .0080 .0070
[0.80, 0.85) .0081 .0070 .0075 .0068 .0060 .0063 .0069 .0050 .0067
[0.85, 0.90) .0059 .0057 .0047 .0058 .0033 .0050 .0037 .0050 .0040
[0.90, 0.95) .0044 .0050 .0035 .0035 .0039 .0035 .0040 .0037 .0044
[0.95, 1.00) .0032 .0037 .0033 .0024 .0021 .0027 .0026 .0023 .0015
[1.00,∞) .0088 .0070 .0094 .0086 .0068 .0066 .0067 .0061 .0055
